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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the arrest of X, the evidence will be admitted. Our homes may
now be invaded upon the fabrication or imaginations of law en-
forcement officers. The Supreme Court did not, or may not, have
weighed the values of police expediency versus privacy and sanc-
tity of the home. In some circumstances, obviously, the decision
may save lives or property. But in others, it may destroy val-
uable personal rights. There must be a middle ground. "Under
our system, suspicion is not enough for an officer to lay hands on
a citizen. It is better, so the Fourth Amendment teaches, that




FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE - NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
DILIGENCE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO OBTAIN NEW TRIAL-The plain-
tiff, an employee of the defendant railroad company, and his road
crew were to assist another crew rerail a locomotive. The engine
was surrounded by snow which had become solidly packed, creat-
ing a hazardous condition. In the course of the work, plaintiff
slipped and fell, sustaining personal injuries. In an action against
the railroad, the trial court entered a verdict for the defendant.
Several months after the judgment, on the grounds of newly dis-
covered evidence, plaintiff moved for a new trial under Rule 60 (b)
(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The alleged
newly discovered evidence was the testimony of a railroad em-
ployee stating that his crew was the first to arrive at the derail-
ment. The newly discovered evidence revealed that before the
plaintiff arrived blow torches had been used around the derailed
engine, causing a considerable amount of the snow to melt. Due
to the extremely cold temperature, the melted snow immediately
refroze and created the icy surface on which the plaintiff had
slipped and sustained his injuries.
The alleged newly discovered evidence was offered after a local
railroad employee's bulletin reported that the plaintiff had lost
his suit against the railroad. After reading of the result, a rail-
road employee offered testimony as to his knowledge of the cir-
cumstances surrounding plaintiff's injuries. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, with one judge dissenting, held
that the plaintiff knew or should have known that another railroad
employee witnessed his fall and that failure to question this witness
15. Henry v. Unlted States, 861 U.6. 98 (1959).
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concerning the accident was a lack of reasonable diligence and did
not warrant the reopening of the final judgment.
The dissent emphasized that although the new evidence was not
procured for the trial because of the unknown fact that the ground
hazard had been artificially created, this evidence could have
changed the result of the trial. In the original action, plaintiff
failed to call this witness because he did not wish to duplicate the
testimony describing the ground surface where he sustained his
injuries. Plisco v. Union R.R., 379 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1967).
The motion for a new trial was brought under Rule 60 (b) (2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule, in part, states
that relief from a final judgment or order will be given upon just
terms where there is "newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
nw trial under Rule 59(b)." 1 Rule 59(b) sets the time for a
motion for a new trial at "not later than 10 days after the entry
of judgment."
Newly discovered evidence is "evidence of a new and material
fact, or new evidence in relation to a fact in issue, discovered
by a party to a cause after the rendition of a verdict or judgment
therein."' 2 Newly discovered evidence is usually uncovered by the
non-prevailing party who moved for a new trial. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provide that a motion for a new trial based
on newly discovered evidence must be made within a reasonable
time and not more than one year after the judgment. In the in-
stant case, the motion was made several months after the judg-
ment was rendered. The granting of a new trial is discretionary
with the trial judge and if there has been an abuse of that dis-
cretion, a court of appeals may overrule the trial court and grant
a new trial.
The substance of the law is stated in the Rules. However,
each case must be decided on its own merits, and on its particular
set of facts. In order that a motion for a new trial be granted,
it must be shown that although the movant exercised due diligence,
he failed to uncover the evidence he now alleges to be newly dis-
covered. 8 Once the trial court rules on the motion for a new trial,
it will not be overturned unless the ruling is clearly erroneous.,
Courts have not favored the granting of a new trial to an
unsuccessful litigant after a judgment has been entered. There
is a substantial burden on the movant to show that diligence was
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
2. Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed.).
3. Moylan v. Slciliano, 292 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1961).
4. Barrington v. Swanson, 249 F.2d 640, 644 (10th Cir. 1967).
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exercised before the trial and to explain why the newly discovered
evidence was not uncovered before the trial.5
While the showing oi due diligence is a requirement to obtain
a new trial, it is not the sole requirement. The newly discovered
evidence must be material to the case, not merely cumulative. 6
Newly discovered evidence which affects only the weight and
credibility of other evidence is not sufficient grounds for a new
trial.7 In addition, the newly discovered evidence must be of a
nature that it will probably produce a different result upon retrial.8
Although courts have been extremely hesitant to grant a new
trial for these reasons, there have been a number of exceptions.9
Since the cases that have granted a new trial have turned on the
specific facts in each individual case, it is necessary to examine
the facts in each instance.
An action for personal injuries sustained in an automobile ac-
cident, brought an order for a new trial because "substantial jus-
tice was not done and the triers of fact should have an oppor-
tunity to resolve the issues presented with all the admissible evi-
dence before them."10 Here, the defendant questioned the plaintiff,
trying to discover the names of eye witnesses. The plaintiff re-
fused to divulge the name of an individual who had arrived at the
scene shortly after the accident had occurred. At the trial, the
defendant learned of an insurance adjuster who had the names of
three witnesses who were travelling in front of the defendant at
the time of the accident. These witnesses disclosed new evidence
which showed that the collision occurred when the plaintiff's auto-
mobile crossed the center line of the highway where it collided
with the defendant's automobile. In granting the new trial the
court said that this newly discovered evidence "is highly relevant
to the central issue and is of such a nature that added to the
evidence previously submitted to the jury, it could reasonably
serve to change the verdict."'" The court held that the trial court
abused its discretion and further revealed that "where a review
5. Martin v. Klein, 172 F. Supp. 778, 780 (D. Mass. 1959). Klelnschmidt v. United
States, 146 F. Supp. 253, 257 (D. Mass. 1956).
6. Black's Law Dictionary (4th Ed.) defines cumulative evidence as "that which
goes to prove what has already been established by other evidence."
Great American Indem. Co. v. Brown, 307 F.2d 306, 309 (6th Cir. 1962); United
States v. 72.71 Acres of Land, 23 F.1R.D. 635, 638 (Md. 1959); Chemical Delinting Co. v.
Jackson, 193 F.2d 123, 127 (5th Cir. 1951).
7. Grant County Deposit Bank v. Greene, 200 F.2d 835, 841 (8th Cir. 1952) ; Chemical
Delinting Co. v. Jackson, aupra note 6 at 127; Brown v. Schwartz, 164 F.2d 151, 152
(5th Cir. 1947).
8. Knight v. Hersh, 813 F.2d 879, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Chemical Delinting Co. v.
Jackson, supra note 6 at 127.
9. Fdgar v. Finley, 312 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1963); DiGiovanni v. DiGlovannantonlo,
233 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Ferrell v. Tralmobile, Inc. 233 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1955).
10. Edgar v. linley, supra note 9 at 528.
11. Id. at 528.
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of material evidence newly discovered after trial clearly indicates
that substantial justice was not done, and where the non-prevailing
party was not dilatory in failing to discover such evidence before
trial, a proper motion for a new trial should be granted."' 1
A new trial was granted in an action to recover payments
made under an installment contract even though due diligence was
not used in securing the evidence.'8 The defendant claimed that
he had made the installment payments, but was forced to pay
again to prevent foreclosure. Three money orders were in ques-
tion. After judgment was rendered against the defendant, he se-
cured photostatic copies of the three money orders which bore the
plaintiff's endorsement. The defendant also produced an affidavit
from the bank auditor stating that the money orders were deposited
to the plaintiff's account. The court, in granting a new trial
stated,
"If, in fact, practially conclusive evidence shows that the
appellant had actually paid all eighteen installments for
the purchase of the trailer, it is obvious that the judgment
should be set aside to prevent a manifest miscarriage of
justice. In such a case the ends of justice may require
granting a new trial even though proper diligence was not
used to secure such evidence for use at the trial."'1
(emphasis supplied).
A third case involved an estate proceeding. A foreign mar-
riage certificate, which was required proof in the case, was re-
quested at a time sufficiently prior to the trial date. However,
it failed to arrive until after judgment had been rendered. The
court said that the marriage certificate was "a key piece of evi-
dence in the litigation . . . and that bona fide efforts were made to
secure it."'' 5 On this basis, the court granted a new trial.
A New Jersey District Court, in denying a motion for a new
trial, summed up the reasons behind its decision by quoting from
a state court decision:
These rules of law must be strictly enforced. If not strictly
enforced, it would open the door for litigants to withhold
available testimony, and then, if the result of the trial was
adverse, resort could be had under the guise of newly dis-
covered testimony to obtain another trial in which the litigant
could correct the mistakes made in the former trial and
perhaps secure a different result. The aim of the law should
12. Id.
13. Ferrell v. Trailmobile, aupra note 9 at 6
14. Id.
15. DiGiovanni v. DIGiovannantonto, supra note 9 at 28.
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be to force litigants to the fullest preparation of their cases
before trial. This can best be accomplished by strictly en-
forcing the principles of law governing new trials.16
The State of North Dakota adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as part of the NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE in 1957.
Since that time the North Dakota courts have not been called upon
to construe Rule 60 (b) (2). It seems reasonable, however, that the
North Dakota courts would require a high degree of diligence in
procuring evidence before trial in order that newly discovered evi-
dence would be a means of obtaining a new trial. In requiring
this high degree of diligence, North Dakota should follow the federal
courts in strictly enforcing the rules governing the granting of new
trials for newly discovered evidence.
RONALD D. MARKOVITS
HUSBAND AND WIFE-WOMAN'S ACTION FOR Loss OF CON-
SORTIUM-DISCRIMINATION ON BASIS OF SEX. - Plaintiff's hus-
band had been injured as a result of the negligent tort of the
defendant aluminum casting company. These injuries resulted in
the plaintiff's loss of consortium of her husband. The circuit court
sustained a demurrer on the grounds that loss of consortium does
not constitute a cause of action. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin held that the loss of consortium action was available
to women. Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d
542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967).
This case is in direct opposition to a recent Tennessee case
which held that a woman had no cause of action for the loss of
consortium due to her husband's injury although the husband would
have had an action if the wife had been so injured. The Tennes-
see court said this was not discrimination on the basis of sex, but
was no more than a practical and logical classification.,
The Tennessee decision is clearly within the majority in cases
involving negligent tort causing loss of consortium. It arises from
the early development of the concept as a cause of action for the
husband only and has continued thus for reasons both substantive
and procedural.
Emerging from the medieval concept of the marital union with
the wife being inferior,2 consortium was originally considered a
16. Moore v. Roseliff Realty Corp., 88 F. Supp. 956. 961 (D.N.J. 1960).
1. Krohn v. PRichardson, Merrill, Inc., 406 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1966).
2. 10 Sr. LI ul U. I4 JT. 276, 277 (1965).
